Defending everyones whipping boy
MYTHILI BHUSNURMATH
IN TERMS of timing, I couldnt have picked a less opportune moment to stick my neck out on bank nationalisation; the public is still smarting at how nationalised bank employees held them to ransom with their strike earlier this month.
But come to think of it, given its connotations think bank nationalisation and Indira Gandhi and the Emergency immediately come to mind there is, probably, never a good time to defend bank nationalisation.
Earlier this year the Congress president and the FM were both ridiculed when they dared to speak in support of nationalisation. If the UPA chairpersons views were, somewhat charitably, put down to economic naivete, the FMs homage was seen as another instance of his anti-reform mindset.
Clearly 40 years after the event, bank nationalisation is still a bad word (never mind that both the US and the UK have only recently gone down the same path). So at the risk of being branded a revisionist, or, perhaps worse, clubbed with Mrs Sonia Gandhi and the FM, let me make my pitch in defence of public sector banks (PSBs).
Before you dismiss this as some sort of plug for PSBs, consider: in 1969, when banks were nationalised, the population per bank branch was 82,000 in the rural areas and 33,000 in urban areas. By 2007 that number had fallen to 17,000 in rural areas and 13,000 in the urban areas. In 1969, just 17% of the branch network was in rural areas; today that number is 32%, thanks almost entirely to PSBs.
Yes, there is a large section (41%) of the population that is still without access to modern banking. But what is indisputable is that but for PSBs, access to banking, especially in the rural areas, would have been far less (see table). As of March 2008, PSBs had 35% of their branch network in rural areas; the corresponding number for new private sector banks was just 6.3% while in metropolitan areas where business is more lucrative , private sector banks led the way with 36% of their branch network in metros as against 20% for PSBs.
Take another parameter: credit growth. It is widely accepted that the financial crisis in many western economies took a turn for the worse after credit markets froze. As banks took fright and shied away from lending, many borrowers were left high and dry, perpetuating a vicious downward spiral. Hence, part of the solution lay in persuading banks to continue lending, despite the slowdown. It is a different matter that few complied!
In India, too, industry chambers and the government have been shouting from the rooftops about the need for banks to continue lending. But once again it is PSBs that have ridden to the rescue; credit extended by PSBs, growing 20.4% in the year to March 2009 as against just 4% and 11% for foreign and private sector banks respectively. Yes, it is possible that when they expand their portfolios in a slowdown (in the larger interest of the economy at the diktat of the government), they might also see a rise in the level of NPAs. But that is the flip side of their delivering on their larger social responsibility and not necessarily a commentary on their efficiency.
Indeed, as the report of the Committee on Financial Sector Assessment points out, far from being slothful behemoths, PSBs have responded well to the challenge of competition . Not only is there an overall convergence in their financial results with the other banking groups but, surprise, surprise, their share in the overall profit of the banking sector has increased (emphasis added).
Moreover, thanks to their implicit government guarantee, PSBs are instrumental in promoting financial stability. Contrast the irrational fear that overtook depositors of ICICI Bank on rumours that the bank was in trouble with their rock-solid faith in Indian Bank back in the 1990s when despite public knowledge of its precarious financial position , there was no run on the bank.
This is not to say all is hunky-dory with PSBs. It is not! It is rather to point out that if we expect PSBs to heed a larger call promote financial inclusion, drop interest rates at governments behest (even when it does not make commercial sense to do so), lend to weaker sections, open branches in remote areas and so on and so forth, we must also be prepared to put up with the downside of their public ownership, of which strikes are just one manifestation. Poor work ethos, slow decision-making , bureaucratic interference , etc., being the others.
Does that mean we should cave in to the demands of PSB employees regardless, simply because they have more nuisance value than employees of say, a BHEL or SAIL Not at all! It merely means there is a case for public ownership of banks in a country like India in economic parlance, at our stage of development PSBs are a public good . So there is no point in berating them they are what they are because that is what we want them to be. It is far better, then, to give them greater professional and operational autonomy , even as we retain public ownership!
The recent strike by nationalised bank employees has made the public see red Everyone loves to hate public sector banks but they meet a larger social need and contribute greatly to financial stability Its far better to give them greater professional and operational autonomy, even as we retain public ownership
Sunday, August 16, 2009
New tax code A paradigm shift - by NK Singh
New tax code A paradigm shift
It will be a test of perseverance and political will to ensure the early enactment of the new tax code and, more importantly, prevent any serious dilution of its basic features, says N K Singh
IN MORE ways than one the new direct tax code is a culmination of tax reforms initiated in the early 90s. Chidambarams dream budget with which I was associated had compressed income-tax rates to three slabs of 10, 20, 30 and corporate rate at 35. This was based on two well accepted paradigms. First that modest tax rates create virtuous circle of improved compliance and widen the tax net. Second, the so-called undocumented Laffer Curve effect in which lowering of tax rates in fact improve overall revenue realisation . The present tax code and the enabling legislation appended with the code bears the imprint of Chidambarams drafting skills and clarity of intent. Pranab Mukherjee must be complemented in having overcome multiple hurdles and in putting this document in public domain.
Taxation must subserve multiple objectives . Most importantly to finance government expenditure but in the process combine equity and efficiency. In doing so it needs to harmonise the objectives of maximising resources with a wider social purpose of fostering development, encouraging capital accumulation and investment as well as minimising the distortionary impact of exemptions designed to benefit a group of individuals or segments of society. Earlier attempts to eliminate this complex contradictory spagetti bowl of distortionary exemptions were stalled by powerful lobbies, a nexus between the law makers, beneficiaries and policy designers. The success of this code is therefore predicated on the ability to withstand these debilitating pressures to restore exemptions in one form or the other.
I am given to understand that the overall impact of the proposed legislation is revenue neutral. I expect this to be revenue positive if past is any guide to the future and the broad principle that lower tax rates will lead to tax widening and improved compliance continues to be valid. One broad criticism of the code could be to question whether it is progressive enough. Given our development compulsions and high incidence of poverty progressivity in tax regime is an important objective. That is why improved revenue buoyancy will be its cardinal test and in some ways it is raison detre . Of course, everyone realises the more heavily a man is supposed to be taxed the more power he has to escape being taxed.
The tax code introduces several features, which deserve attention:
First and foremost in fostering savings and investments by discouraging consumption . This is in line with what analysts have suggested that India unlike China must move away from a consumption-led growth to an investment-led growth. Their prescription for China is just the opposite. This explains the rationale of EET (Exempt Exempt Tax), namely, initial investment and interest are exempt but withdrawal would be subject to normal taxes. This will cause hardship for PF, senior citizens and others who towards the latter part of their life wish to enjoy better life quality through enhanced consumption. Similarly, for the corporate sector the exemption regime moves away from a profit-based to investment-based incentives for specific categories of investments in sectors like power, oil and gas, SEZs. However, it is often suggested that in times of recession consumption also needs a stimulus. The higher disposable incomes in the hands of consumers and corporates would hopefully achieve this purpose.
SECOND , the code by accepting the principle of grand-fathering and seeking prospective applications avoids multiple controversies and makes for easier transition.
Third, while retaining exemptions in religious institutions but subjecting other trusts and organisations to a modest 15% tax, it combines the virtue of pragmatism, while minimising multiple misuse.
Fourth, the simplification of capital gains tax by eliminating the distinction between short-term and long-term gains and encouraging more transactions by eliminating the security transactions tax and simplifying the dividend distribution tax are positive.
Fifth, the provision of a minimum alternative tax at 2% of the value of gross assets is based on the principle of incentivising efficiency . This deserves wider consultations. It could discourage long-term lumpy investments and more importantly not protect against business cycles with prolonged recession with negative cash flows if companies do not have the reserves to meet this onerous liability. At the same time the original intend of MAT needed to be restructured to subserve its original intent.
Sixth, while the provisions of general avoidance rule and double taxation is designed to prevent misuse, it is not clear if a code can override existing international treaties and obligations embedded in double taxation agreements. Given international experience and the need to discourage round tripping, this is a good time to renegotiate our multiple double taxation agreements by aligning them with the provisions of the tax code.
Finally, litigation and tax pendency has been an area of continuing concern. Alternative tax resolution methods and dispute settlement mechanism need further innovation . The constitution of the National Tax Tribunal to hear appeals from ITAT could minimise high court pendencies. Nonetheless , the existing appellate mechanisms which the code endorses need further consideration . The present regime leaves both revenue officials and assessees dissatisfied even making the allowances that their interest can never be symmetrical. The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the working of the Public Accounts Committee that induce assessing officers to make large additions and exhaust all appellate processes result in serious distortions.
This needs a mindset change embedded in greater trust and accepting the bona fide judgements of tax officials. All over the world, tax officials are never high in popularity rating. While we must seek greater transparency and minimise scope for corruption , we need to invest more in training, technology infrastructure and resources. India has one of the lowest cost of compliance even compared to emerging markets. As we move to adopt a new code, we need to assign more talent and resources to the revenue department.
The new legislation is a paradigm shift in our approach to taxation. It will be a test of perseverance and political will to ensure its early enactment and more importantly prevent any serious dilution of its basic features . The code is a composite package. This is a case where the whole is bigger than mere sum of the parts.
(The author, a former revenue secretary,
is a Rajya Sabha member)
It will be a test of perseverance and political will to ensure the early enactment of the new tax code and, more importantly, prevent any serious dilution of its basic features, says N K Singh
IN MORE ways than one the new direct tax code is a culmination of tax reforms initiated in the early 90s. Chidambarams dream budget with which I was associated had compressed income-tax rates to three slabs of 10, 20, 30 and corporate rate at 35. This was based on two well accepted paradigms. First that modest tax rates create virtuous circle of improved compliance and widen the tax net. Second, the so-called undocumented Laffer Curve effect in which lowering of tax rates in fact improve overall revenue realisation . The present tax code and the enabling legislation appended with the code bears the imprint of Chidambarams drafting skills and clarity of intent. Pranab Mukherjee must be complemented in having overcome multiple hurdles and in putting this document in public domain.
Taxation must subserve multiple objectives . Most importantly to finance government expenditure but in the process combine equity and efficiency. In doing so it needs to harmonise the objectives of maximising resources with a wider social purpose of fostering development, encouraging capital accumulation and investment as well as minimising the distortionary impact of exemptions designed to benefit a group of individuals or segments of society. Earlier attempts to eliminate this complex contradictory spagetti bowl of distortionary exemptions were stalled by powerful lobbies, a nexus between the law makers, beneficiaries and policy designers. The success of this code is therefore predicated on the ability to withstand these debilitating pressures to restore exemptions in one form or the other.
I am given to understand that the overall impact of the proposed legislation is revenue neutral. I expect this to be revenue positive if past is any guide to the future and the broad principle that lower tax rates will lead to tax widening and improved compliance continues to be valid. One broad criticism of the code could be to question whether it is progressive enough. Given our development compulsions and high incidence of poverty progressivity in tax regime is an important objective. That is why improved revenue buoyancy will be its cardinal test and in some ways it is raison detre . Of course, everyone realises the more heavily a man is supposed to be taxed the more power he has to escape being taxed.
The tax code introduces several features, which deserve attention:
First and foremost in fostering savings and investments by discouraging consumption . This is in line with what analysts have suggested that India unlike China must move away from a consumption-led growth to an investment-led growth. Their prescription for China is just the opposite. This explains the rationale of EET (Exempt Exempt Tax), namely, initial investment and interest are exempt but withdrawal would be subject to normal taxes. This will cause hardship for PF, senior citizens and others who towards the latter part of their life wish to enjoy better life quality through enhanced consumption. Similarly, for the corporate sector the exemption regime moves away from a profit-based to investment-based incentives for specific categories of investments in sectors like power, oil and gas, SEZs. However, it is often suggested that in times of recession consumption also needs a stimulus. The higher disposable incomes in the hands of consumers and corporates would hopefully achieve this purpose.
SECOND , the code by accepting the principle of grand-fathering and seeking prospective applications avoids multiple controversies and makes for easier transition.
Third, while retaining exemptions in religious institutions but subjecting other trusts and organisations to a modest 15% tax, it combines the virtue of pragmatism, while minimising multiple misuse.
Fourth, the simplification of capital gains tax by eliminating the distinction between short-term and long-term gains and encouraging more transactions by eliminating the security transactions tax and simplifying the dividend distribution tax are positive.
Fifth, the provision of a minimum alternative tax at 2% of the value of gross assets is based on the principle of incentivising efficiency . This deserves wider consultations. It could discourage long-term lumpy investments and more importantly not protect against business cycles with prolonged recession with negative cash flows if companies do not have the reserves to meet this onerous liability. At the same time the original intend of MAT needed to be restructured to subserve its original intent.
Sixth, while the provisions of general avoidance rule and double taxation is designed to prevent misuse, it is not clear if a code can override existing international treaties and obligations embedded in double taxation agreements. Given international experience and the need to discourage round tripping, this is a good time to renegotiate our multiple double taxation agreements by aligning them with the provisions of the tax code.
Finally, litigation and tax pendency has been an area of continuing concern. Alternative tax resolution methods and dispute settlement mechanism need further innovation . The constitution of the National Tax Tribunal to hear appeals from ITAT could minimise high court pendencies. Nonetheless , the existing appellate mechanisms which the code endorses need further consideration . The present regime leaves both revenue officials and assessees dissatisfied even making the allowances that their interest can never be symmetrical. The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the working of the Public Accounts Committee that induce assessing officers to make large additions and exhaust all appellate processes result in serious distortions.
This needs a mindset change embedded in greater trust and accepting the bona fide judgements of tax officials. All over the world, tax officials are never high in popularity rating. While we must seek greater transparency and minimise scope for corruption , we need to invest more in training, technology infrastructure and resources. India has one of the lowest cost of compliance even compared to emerging markets. As we move to adopt a new code, we need to assign more talent and resources to the revenue department.
The new legislation is a paradigm shift in our approach to taxation. It will be a test of perseverance and political will to ensure its early enactment and more importantly prevent any serious dilution of its basic features . The code is a composite package. This is a case where the whole is bigger than mere sum of the parts.
(The author, a former revenue secretary,
is a Rajya Sabha member)
Thursday, August 13, 2009
An idea whose time has come - courtesy economic times
The new direct taxes code is a great idea, many of the provisions are well intentioned and most importantly, time has come to embrace, adapt and run with the code as early as possible, says Sudhir Kapadia
THE freshly unveiled direct taxes code (DTC) is an idea which was overdue and whose time has perhaps never been more appropriate. There seem to be three key objectives behind the introduction of the DTC: simplification of language, resulting in lesser litigation; a law which promotes inclusive growth and yet retains the incentives for businesses to make profits; and allow businesses to function in the free market economy but with proper regulations. This article attempts to analyse some of the key provisions of the DTC in the light of the above objectives.
Taking a leaf out of the Chinese tax code, the DTC pegs the corporate tax rate to 25% which is clearly a very attractive rate compared to prevailing rate elsewhere. This, of course, comes with the removal of profitlinked incentives. We now have investment-linked incentives in specific sectors (infrastructure, power, exploration and production of mineral oil, etc) to incentivise capital formation and to remove the incentive to shift profits from “taxable units” to “exempt units”. We also now have capital assets deployed in the businesses (e.g., plant and machinery) to be treated as business assets and any profits arising on sale of these assets to be treated as normal business income and not as capital gains.
In practical terms, a company will now be subject to the same uniform rate of 25% tax on gains from transfer of such business capital assets as against the current rate of 20% for long-term capital gains on transfer of all capital assets. The downside in these provisions is the fact that a loss arising on such a business transfer will not be allowed to be written off in one year but will be amortised like depreciation over a period of time. This provision seems to be inconsistent with the treatment of gains as business income in the year when the gains arise.
However, there is a significant dampener to this feel-good story in the form of the new basis of levy of minimum alternate tax (MAT). The MAT will now be levied at 2% of the value of gross assets in the case of all companies except in the case of banking companies (tax at 0.25% for banking companies). This shift in the MAT base from book profits to gross assets is sought to be justified on the grounds of encouraging “optimal utilisation of the assets and thereby increased efficiency”. This measure, however, seems to run counter to the objective of encouraging capital investment for productive growth. For e.g., in the case of an infrastructure company where the pay back on the investments is longer, on the one hand we have the investment-linked capital allowance reducing taxable profits significantly, on the other hand is the imposition of MAT calculated at the same base of capital investments.
To make matters worse, there is no provision for reducing liabilities incurred for acquisition of assets, i.e., MAT is to be calculated on value of gross assets without corresponding reduction in borrowings incurred. This could result in a kind of “punitive tax” on capital-intensive companies including public sector companies as well as chronically sick companies making consistent losses.
A very significant shift is sought to be made in the area of capital gains taxation. Since 1991, capital gains on sale of shares and securities has always been accorded preferential tax treatment to encourage investment in equity market. The DTC now proposes to remove the distinction between short-term and long-term capital gains on all classes of assets, thereby taxing any gains on transfer of capital assets at normal rates of tax.
THUSindividuals in the higher tax bracket of 30% would be more adversely affected than companies, as companies would pay taxes at a uniform tax rate of 25% on similar gains. This also means that the abolition of the Securities Transaction Tax (STT) will be more than made up by a levy of normal tax on all stock market transactions, be they short term or long term. Further, gains on transfer of immovable property which at present is at 20% if property is held for more than three years will now be taxed at the normal rate of 30% for individuals in the higher tax bracket and 25% for companies.
Some very significant changes are proposed in the international tax area. A time-tested principle of characterising a foreign company as a resident Indian company on the basis of the foreign company being wholly controlled and managed from India is sought to be substituted by a more stringent and arguably a more subjective rule, i.e., a foreign company partly controlled and managed from India will also be regarded as an Indian resident company. In its present form, it would appear that overseas subsidiaries of Indian companies would be subjected to taxation in India on their worldwide income solely on the basis of them being “partly controlled and managed from India”. This seems to be an unintended onerous outcome which needs to be corrected.
An elaborate provision spelling out the general anti-avoidance rule is proposed. While it has features of comprehensiveness, it seems ripe for several different interpretations in respect of features like “commercial substance”, “round trip financing”, “accommodating party”, etc. It is further provided that the general anti-abuse rule will override the provisions of any tax treaty. Thus, for example, the current controversy on the use of Mauritius DTAT will get further ammunition as the Revenue will now seem to invoke the general antiabuse rule in specific cases to override the provisions of the Mauritius treaty. If the intent behind the code was to eliminate litigation and simplify provisions of law, this particular provision certainly does not stand anywhere close to achieving that objective.
In continuation of the introduction of the Alternate Dispute Mechanism in Budget 2009, the DTC seems to now extend this benefit to all taxpayers and not restrict it to foreign companies which is a welcome move and will help the entire tax community. Also, there is a proposal to introduce advance pricing mechanism on transfer pricing which has been a long standing request by multinational corporations. All in all, the idea of the DTC is great, many of the provisions are well intentioned and most importantly time has come to embrace, adapt and run with the DTC as early as possible.
(The author is Partner, Tax & Regulatory
Services, Ernst & Young Pvt Ltd)
THE freshly unveiled direct taxes code (DTC) is an idea which was overdue and whose time has perhaps never been more appropriate. There seem to be three key objectives behind the introduction of the DTC: simplification of language, resulting in lesser litigation; a law which promotes inclusive growth and yet retains the incentives for businesses to make profits; and allow businesses to function in the free market economy but with proper regulations. This article attempts to analyse some of the key provisions of the DTC in the light of the above objectives.
Taking a leaf out of the Chinese tax code, the DTC pegs the corporate tax rate to 25% which is clearly a very attractive rate compared to prevailing rate elsewhere. This, of course, comes with the removal of profitlinked incentives. We now have investment-linked incentives in specific sectors (infrastructure, power, exploration and production of mineral oil, etc) to incentivise capital formation and to remove the incentive to shift profits from “taxable units” to “exempt units”. We also now have capital assets deployed in the businesses (e.g., plant and machinery) to be treated as business assets and any profits arising on sale of these assets to be treated as normal business income and not as capital gains.
In practical terms, a company will now be subject to the same uniform rate of 25% tax on gains from transfer of such business capital assets as against the current rate of 20% for long-term capital gains on transfer of all capital assets. The downside in these provisions is the fact that a loss arising on such a business transfer will not be allowed to be written off in one year but will be amortised like depreciation over a period of time. This provision seems to be inconsistent with the treatment of gains as business income in the year when the gains arise.
However, there is a significant dampener to this feel-good story in the form of the new basis of levy of minimum alternate tax (MAT). The MAT will now be levied at 2% of the value of gross assets in the case of all companies except in the case of banking companies (tax at 0.25% for banking companies). This shift in the MAT base from book profits to gross assets is sought to be justified on the grounds of encouraging “optimal utilisation of the assets and thereby increased efficiency”. This measure, however, seems to run counter to the objective of encouraging capital investment for productive growth. For e.g., in the case of an infrastructure company where the pay back on the investments is longer, on the one hand we have the investment-linked capital allowance reducing taxable profits significantly, on the other hand is the imposition of MAT calculated at the same base of capital investments.
To make matters worse, there is no provision for reducing liabilities incurred for acquisition of assets, i.e., MAT is to be calculated on value of gross assets without corresponding reduction in borrowings incurred. This could result in a kind of “punitive tax” on capital-intensive companies including public sector companies as well as chronically sick companies making consistent losses.
A very significant shift is sought to be made in the area of capital gains taxation. Since 1991, capital gains on sale of shares and securities has always been accorded preferential tax treatment to encourage investment in equity market. The DTC now proposes to remove the distinction between short-term and long-term capital gains on all classes of assets, thereby taxing any gains on transfer of capital assets at normal rates of tax.
THUSindividuals in the higher tax bracket of 30% would be more adversely affected than companies, as companies would pay taxes at a uniform tax rate of 25% on similar gains. This also means that the abolition of the Securities Transaction Tax (STT) will be more than made up by a levy of normal tax on all stock market transactions, be they short term or long term. Further, gains on transfer of immovable property which at present is at 20% if property is held for more than three years will now be taxed at the normal rate of 30% for individuals in the higher tax bracket and 25% for companies.
Some very significant changes are proposed in the international tax area. A time-tested principle of characterising a foreign company as a resident Indian company on the basis of the foreign company being wholly controlled and managed from India is sought to be substituted by a more stringent and arguably a more subjective rule, i.e., a foreign company partly controlled and managed from India will also be regarded as an Indian resident company. In its present form, it would appear that overseas subsidiaries of Indian companies would be subjected to taxation in India on their worldwide income solely on the basis of them being “partly controlled and managed from India”. This seems to be an unintended onerous outcome which needs to be corrected.
An elaborate provision spelling out the general anti-avoidance rule is proposed. While it has features of comprehensiveness, it seems ripe for several different interpretations in respect of features like “commercial substance”, “round trip financing”, “accommodating party”, etc. It is further provided that the general anti-abuse rule will override the provisions of any tax treaty. Thus, for example, the current controversy on the use of Mauritius DTAT will get further ammunition as the Revenue will now seem to invoke the general antiabuse rule in specific cases to override the provisions of the Mauritius treaty. If the intent behind the code was to eliminate litigation and simplify provisions of law, this particular provision certainly does not stand anywhere close to achieving that objective.
In continuation of the introduction of the Alternate Dispute Mechanism in Budget 2009, the DTC seems to now extend this benefit to all taxpayers and not restrict it to foreign companies which is a welcome move and will help the entire tax community. Also, there is a proposal to introduce advance pricing mechanism on transfer pricing which has been a long standing request by multinational corporations. All in all, the idea of the DTC is great, many of the provisions are well intentioned and most importantly time has come to embrace, adapt and run with the DTC as early as possible.
(The author is Partner, Tax & Regulatory
Services, Ernst & Young Pvt Ltd)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)